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N.H.P.U.C. Case No.	DC 10-160
Exhibit No.	#14
Witness	Michael E. Hachey
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1 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
2 BEFORE THE
3 NEW HAMPSHIRE
4 PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

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6 DE 10-160

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8 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
9 Investigation into Effect of Customer Migration on Energy Service Rates

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12 PREFILED TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL E. HACHEY
13 ON BEHALF OF TRANSCANADA POWER MARKETING LTD. AND
14 TRANSCANADA HYDRO NORTHEAST INC.

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16
17 September 15, 2010

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19 Background and Qualifications

20 Q. Please state your name and business address.

21 A. My name is Michael E. Hachey. My business address is 110 Turnpike
22 Road – Suite 203, Westborough, MA 01581-2863.

23 Q. Who is your current employer and what positions do you hold ?

24 A. I am employed by TransCanada Power Marketing Ltd. (“TCPM”). In my
25 current position I am Vice President and Director, Eastern Commercial.

26 Q. What is your background and what are your qualifications ?

27 A. I have a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering and a Master of
28 Engineering Degree in Electric Power Engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.
29 I have over 30 years experience in the electric power industry, including 11 years with
30 TransCanada Power Marketing. I was previously employed by New England Power
31 Company for 21 years. I have participated in proceedings before the New Hampshire
32 Public Utilities Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and other state

1 regulatory commissions. In my current position I am responsible for government and
2 regulatory affairs, retail marketing, and property taxes.

3 **Q. Please explain what TCPM does.**

4 A. TCPM is a competitive supplier of electricity in the Northeast United
5 States and is a licensed electric retail supplier in the states of New Hampshire,
6 Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Maine and New York. TCPM is an indirect
7 wholly owned subsidiary of TransCanada Corporation, a leader in the responsible
8 development and reliable operation of North American energy infrastructure, with a
9 network of more than 36,500 miles of pipeline facilities and approximately 355 billion
10 cubic feet of gas storage capacity. As a growing independent power producer,
11 TransCanada owns, controls or is developing approximately 10,900 megawatts of power
12 generation in Canada and the United States.

13 **Purpose of Testimony**

14 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony ?**

15 A. The purpose of my testimony is to address some of the issues that were
16 raised in the Order of Notice that the Commission issued in this docket regarding
17 migration, PSNH's power purchase practices, and PSNH's suggestion that the
18 Commission ought to consider a non-bypassable charge to recover its costs of providing
19 power to default service customers. In addition, I think it is important to provide the
20 Commission with the perspective of a competitive supplier that operates in the New
21 Hampshire market and other markets in New England. As the Commission noted in the
22 Order of Notice, this docket was opened to "investigate the issues related to PSNH's

1 customer migration and PSNH's practices for procuring power not supplied by its owned
2 generation." The Order of Notice went on to say:

3 The filing raises, inter alia, issues related to whether PSNH's suggested creation
4 of a non bypassable mechanism to bill a portion of energy service charges to all
5 customers is permitted pursuant to New Hampshire law and is a reasonable way
6 to address the cost impacts of customer migration on non-migrating energy
7 service customers; what other potential methods exist to address those cost
8 impacts including, but not limited to, the targeted use of technology-based
9 initiatives and/or targeted rate mechanisms; the interplay of PSNH's current
10 supplemental power purchase practices with customer migration; whether
11 alternative procurement strategies should be implemented; and the appropriate
12 scope of the proceeding.
13

14 **Q. Why did TCPM and TransCanada Northeast Hydro Inc. intervene in**
15 **this docket ?**

16 A. TransCanada is concerned about what PSNH has referred to as "the
17 upward pressure on the ES rate" caused by increased migration levels and what PSNH
18 has proposed as a solution to this. TransCanada has serious concerns about any effort to
19 take some portion of the costs of providing default service and have those costs assessed
20 against customers who have migrated to competitive suppliers through a non-bypassable
21 charge. TransCanada believes that there are steps the Commission should take to insure
22 that some of the risks associated with purchasing power to serve the customers on default
23 service are born by a provider of that power, rather than by PSNH customers and in this
24 manner the need to pass on costs through a non-bypassable charge would be obviated.
25 TransCanada believes that the increased migration of customers from default service
26 shows that the market is working for the larger retail customers and believes that any
27 steps that are taken should be done in a way that enhances this positive development of
28 the market for electricity in New Hampshire for all classes of customers.

1 **Customer Migration and the Process for Purchasing Power**

2 **Q. What is your understanding of the current status of migration of**
3 **default service customers to competitive suppliers ?**

4 A. It is my understanding that the level of migration is approximately 31% of
5 sales, which is up from 24% as of the end of 2009.

6 **Q. Does PSNH believe that the current drop in load obligation due to**
7 **migration will continue long term ?**

8 A. No. On pages 7 and 8 of his prefiled testimony in this docket Mr.
9 Baumann makes it clear that he believes the current drop in energy service load
10 obligation is due to low market prices, which he characterizes as the “current short-term
11 unprecedented market price decline”. While he thinks that the “short-term” market
12 decline is a function of “unprecedented low natural gas prices” he thinks current market
13 prices “may very well be short-lived.”

14 **Q. What is PSNH suggesting ought to be done in light of this migration of**
15 **customers ?**

16 A. PSNH is suggesting that some of the costs of purchasing power being
17 provided to default service customers should either be paid by all customers or just by the
18 customers who have migrated. Baumann prefiled testimony, page 9, lines 20-24.

19 **Q. Do you agree with what PSNH is suggesting ought to be done in light**
20 **of this migration of customers ?**

21 A. I do not agree that the increase in costs that Mr. Baumann is referring to is an
22 unintended result of restructuring. I believe that many of the additional costs may be the
23 result of purchase power decisions that PSNH has made. Since the process that PSNH

1 follows is out of step with what other distribution companies in NH and New England
2 follow when purchasing power to meet default customer demand, I believe the
3 Commission should require PSNH to follow a different method going forward, similar to
4 the methodology that other NH distribution companies follow. That process includes
5 issuing open and competitive Requests for Proposals for supplemental power, if needed,
6 on a schedule approved by the Commission.

7 **Q. Do you think it would be appropriate for PSNH to be able to pass**
8 **costs of providing default service on to migrating customers ?**

9 A. No. I do not think that would be appropriate for the following reasons:
10 1) customers now have a statutory right to choose their electric supplier without bearing
11 the burden of newly-imposed stranded costs from the local utility; 2) socialization of
12 utility inefficiencies will not promote good operating practice; and 3) the costs in this
13 instance result from power supply management decisions by PSNH and not any fault of
14 the customer. PSNH's response to data request Staff 1-2, a copy of which is attached,
15 shows the magnitude of the dollars at stake and the impact that its purchase power
16 decisions can have.

17 **Q. Do you think that the power purchases that PSNH has made to serve**
18 **default service customers have been reasonable or prudent ?**

19 A. No. As I argued in my prefiled testimony in DE 09-180, based on the
20 costs per MWH of the purchases that PSNH has made that were used to serve default
21 energy service customers in 2009 and 2010, it appears that many of the purchases may
22 have been made either at or near the point of peak energy pricing in 2008. This suggests
23 a lack of prudence on their part. Moreover, as we argued in DE 09-180, had PSNH

1 actually followed its own 2007 LCIRP the 2010 purchases would have been made
2 “during May through the filing date of the final forecast (normally in November)” of
3 2009 and it would have been in a much better position to recognize the significant
4 increase in customer migration, thereby scaling back its purchases, and it would have
5 obtained much better pricing for the purchases it did make. As PSNH indicated during
6 the proceeding, it did not review or utilize any private forecast services prior to making
7 purchases of power, but it did review information publicly available from NYMEX and
8 other similar organizations. While PSNH has refused to provide TransCanada with any
9 detailed information about the power that it purchased and that has been used to supply
10 default service customers, what is abundantly clear is that purchases made in January,
11 August and September of 2008 were made at a significant premium to the prices PSNH
12 would have paid if it had simply followed the strategy laid out in its own LCIRP. My
13 understanding of PSNH’s explanation for this abandonment of its LCIRP strategy is that
14 it had a market view that prices seen in 2008 would increase in the future. This is called
15 “market timing”, a practice PSNH simultaneously claims it does not follow. PSNH had
16 no reasonable explanation of whether it ever considered the possibility that prices could
17 subsequently fall. The common sense problem with PSNH’s market view is that
18 ordinarily one would expect a demand response to such a sudden and sharp run-up in
19 market prices (“market” in this case would include fuel markets which tend to drive
20 electric prices), and there was no reason to rush into purchases for calendar year 2009 or
21 2010. Further, conforming to the LCIRP would have enabled PSNH to better assess
22 customer migration as it made its supplemental purchases.

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Restructuring Principles

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Q. Do you think it would be consistent with restructuring principles included in the NH restructuring law for PSNH to pass the costs which they have identified on to migrating customers ?

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A. No. As I noted in my prefiled testimony in DE 10-180, I do not think that it would be consistent with restructuring principles for PSNH to pass costs associated with providing default service on to migrating customers. I pointed out a number of provisions in the NH restructuring law that I believe are relevant to this issue:

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“When customer choice is introduced, services and rates should be unbundled to provide customers clear price information on the cost components of generation, transmission, distribution, and any other ancillary charges.” RSA 374-F:3,III.

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“Default service should be designed to provide a safety net and to assure universal access and system integrity. Default service should be procured through the competitive market and may be administered by independent third parties. Any prudently incurred costs arising from compliance with the renewable portfolio standards of RSA 362-F for default service or purchased power agreements shall be recovered through the default service charge. The allocation of the costs of administering default service should be borne by the customers of default service in a manner approved by the commission. If the commission determines it to be in the public interest, the commission may implement measures to discourage misuse, or long-term use, of default service.” RSA 374-F:3,V(c).

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“New Hampshire should move deliberately to replace traditional planning mechanisms with market driven choice as the means of supplying resource needs.” RSA 374-F:3,XIV.

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What Should the Commission Require of PSNH Going Forward

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Q. Are there steps that PSNH could take to try to keep the costs down ?

1 A. Yes. I believe that PSNH should use an open and competitive RFP
2 process, procedurally similar to what Unitil and National Grid use, to obtain the power it
3 needs to supplement the power that it obtains from its own generating assets in order to
4 meet default service customer demand.

5 **Q. What is your understanding of how Unitil and National Grid procure**
6 **power for default service ?**

7 A. It is my understanding that both Unitil and National Grid obtain the power
8 they need to serve default customers through an RFP process.

9 **Q. What is your understanding of how PSNH's affiliate distribution**
10 **companies in other states handle the procurement of power to meet default service**
11 **needs ?**

12 A. It is my understanding that PSNH affiliates Connecticut Light & Power
13 and Western Massachusetts Electric Company both use an RFP process to obtain the
14 power needed to serve default service customers.

15 **Q. Has PSNH ever solicited TransCanada for the purpose of making**
16 **wholesale power purchasers?**

17 A. No. TransCanada personnel have no record or memory of having been
18 solicited for wholesale power purchases by PSNH, yet TransCanada is a significant New
19 Hampshire generator of electricity and has won numerous competitive wholesale power
20 solicitations with utilities throughout New England. TransCanada has won competitive
21 solicitations from both Unitil and Granite State Electric in New Hampshire.

22 **Q. Are you familiar with the alternatives that the Office of Consumer**
23 **Advocate has laid out in Mr. Traum's prefiled testimony in this docket ?**

1 A. Yes, I have reviewed Mr. Traum's testimony.

2 **Q. Do you wish to comment on the four alternative ideas that he**
3 **proposed ?**

4 A. Yes, I will provide a brief summary of each alternative and my comments
5 following each summary.

6 **Alternative #1** – that PSNH divest itself of its owned generation and contractual
7 commitments for energy and then bid out its ES requirements for the different customer
8 classes, using RFPs in a manner consistent with how UES and Grid currently manage
9 their obligation to provide default ES. Alternatively, if PSNH retained its generation
10 assets, it could sell their outputs (energy, capacity, etc.) into the wholesale market and
11 then utilize the RFP model to provide default ES to its customers.

12 Comment on Alternative #1: TransCanada supports this as an alternative for
13 further evaluation by all parties. Consideration needs to be given to the timing of a
14 divestiture to ensure that the asset value is maximized for the benefit of PSNH's
15 customers. The second option posed within this alternative - selling all the assets into the
16 market and buying all load competitively – would result in two important benefits for
17 PSNH's customers. First, competitive suppliers would manage the migration risk of
18 PSNH's customers. Assuming PSNH would bid out their load by customer class, the
19 less-mobile residential class would incur minimal to no migration risk premium, while
20 the highly mobile larger customers would incur a higher risk premium. These customers
21 could easily avoid this premium by signing with a competitive supplier. Second, each of
22 PSNH's generating assets could be carefully examined for its market value on a regular

1 basis. If an asset was not attracting sufficient market revenues to cover its going forward
2 costs, it would need to be considered for retirement.

3 **Alternative #2** - allocate or assign all of the costs, and the outputs (energy,
4 capacity, etc.) from PSNH's units and contractual commitments to two general groups of
5 customers: one group comprised of residential customers who have a low migration rate;
6 the second group comprised of large commercial and industrial customers. The
7 allocation methodology between the two groups would have to be determined. Under
8 this approach PSNH, or another entity, would make purchase and sales decisions in order
9 to develop separate ES rates and reconciliations for the two groups, rather than
10 developing one rate as the Company does today.

11 **Comment on Alternative #2:** TransCanada believes this alternative offers the
12 most potential to resolve PSNH's power supply management issues at this time. Simply
13 said, PSNH's larger customers have numerous options available to them in the market.
14 They do not need to rely on PSNH to reserve supply on their behalf. Other customers
15 should not bear the cost of PSNH's attempts to maintain a "free option" for these larger
16 customers to return to PSNH supply. PSNH needs to transition to a focus on maintaining
17 a power supply only for its small customers, and carry larger customers (to the extent
18 any remain) at monthly market rates.

19 **Alternative #3** - quantify the costs that PSNH incurs to manage its portfolio in a
20 way that allows migrating customers to return on a month-to-month basis. Those costs
21 could be recovered through a mechanism, perhaps similar to the current Stranded Cost
22 Recovery Charge, that is paid by all customers, rather than being recovered through ES

1 which is only paid by customers who do not migrate. This would avoid at least some of
2 the current cost shifting that is occurring, and would in essence require those who can and
3 do migrate to pay for at least some of the additional costs they impose on default ES for
4 the service of last resort option that it provides to them.

5 Comment on Alternative #3: TransCanada believes this alternative results in
6 PSNH attempting to maintain a return option for its larger customers. As stated in our
7 comment on alternative #2, this results in a completely unnecessary expense to preserve
8 an unnecessary option.

9 **Alternative #4** – do not allow customers who choose a competitive supplier to
10 return to service provided by the utility for a year due to capacity assignments. This
11 would allow PSNH to develop a rate for those who do not migrate, as well as rates for
12 those who have migrated but who return to default ES within the stay-out period. The
13 rates for those who return would be more reflective of the costs of providing that service,
14 which would avoid any subsidization of returning customers by captive customers. The
15 OCA sees this approach as away to reduce any opportunity to game the system by
16 migrating monthly to the detriment of non-migrating customers. This could be
17 considered independently or in conjunction with other approaches.

18 Comment on Alternative #4: TransCanada believes that this alternative could be
19 considered in conjunction with alternative #2.

20

21 **Conclusion**

22 **Q. What is TransCanada's recommendation to the Commission in this**
23 **docket ?**

1 A. Transcanada recommends that the Commission require PSNH, on a going
2 forward basis, to follow an open and transparent RFP process like what Unitil and
3 National Grid must follow for the purchase of power, modified as necessary to account
4 for PSNH's present status as a generator.

5 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony ?**

6 A. Yes.

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